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Abstract. We argue that the current approaches to online social networking 
give rise to numerous challenges regarding the management of the multiple fac-
ets of people’s digital identities within and around social networking sites 
(SNS). We propose an architecture for enabling people to better manage their 
SNS identities that is informed by the way the core Internet protocols developed 
to support interoperation of proprietary network protocols, and based on the 
idea of Separation of Concerns [1]. This does not require modification of exist-
ing services but is predicated on providing a connecting layer over them, both 
as a mechanism to address problems of privacy and identity, and to create op-
portunities to open up online social networking to a much richer set of possible 
interactions and applications. 
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1 Introduction 
Online social network sites such as Twitter, Facebook and Google+ have become 
enormously popular over recent years, for example; Facebook now claims to have 
over 1 billion active accounts.1  This popularity has been driven by many factors: the 
desire we have as people to communicate and to belong; the convenience that is pro-
vided by offloading contact management to external services; and the entertainment 
value of keeping up with our friends, family and acquaintances. Their popularity has 
led to these, and related, services becoming synonymous with social networking, but 
this popularity masks a number of problems with their implementation and structure. 
In real life, social networking is far more broadly defined: as social beings we are 
well known to benefit from involvement and participation in groups [2]. We partici-
pate in multiple, often overlapping, social networks simultaneously rather than one 
all-encompassing social network as Facebook, Google+, etc. aspire to be. The tension 
between our many online identities and the desire of companies such as Facebook and 
Google to force us to present just a single identity through their ‘real name’ policies 
                                                            
1  http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57525797-93 
[3] is an example of the evidence that our lives are far more complex than that which 
is captured by these services. 
Observing that at least part of the problem is the centralized nature of these com-
mercial services, some have proposed decentralized equivalents, e.g., Diaspora.2  
Decentralization certainly mitigates many of the problems of the large centralized 
social networks, e.g., resilience, need for personal control, support for multiple identi-
ties, but it is not alone sufficient to address the problems raised in online social net-
working (discussed in section 2). 
Our position is informed by observation of the development of computer network-
ing in the 1970s and 1980s: the industry moved from many different, mutually in-
compatible, proprietary networking standards towards a single common inter-
operation protocol now recognize as the Internet Protocol (IP). We advocate a similar 
move in the world of online social networking, both to address problems of privacy 
and identity, but also to open up social networking to a much richer set of possible 
interactions and applications. 
By analogy with the development of the Internet’s TCP/IP protocol suite (dis-
cussed in section 3), we argue that social networking requires a new architecture that 
is sufficiently flexible to encompass the very broad range of social network interac-
tions in which we participate (discussed in section 4). We present and discuss a pro-
posal for such an architecture, alongside initial exploratory prototype development 
and experiments we are carrying out into its implementation (discussed in section 5). 
2 One Size Does Not Fit All 
Notwithstanding the efforts of a handful of corporations to become pre-eminent in 
global social networking, notably Facebook and Google, it seems clear that need for a 
richer set of services will remain. Moving outside nations where English is commonly 
spoken, whether as first or second language, we find a rich set of social media ser-
vices. For example, use of VK is widespread in Russian speaking countries; after 
having been created in the US, Orkut is now 59% Brazilian; and in China, RenRen 
and Sina Weibo are used instead of Facebook and Twitter. 
However, many other online communities also behave as social networks in terms 
of the interactions they support (commenting, following, sharing). For example, Am-
azon reviews, blog-specific commentator communities, personal and community 
YouTube channels, Github source code repositories, and even non-public Enterprise 
internal communications. Indeed, companies have been formed to support this broad-
er definition of more specific communities. For example, Ning3 supports over 2 mil-
lion communities, ranging in size from just tens to over a million members, within 
which you can either reuse an existing identity (Facebook, Google+, Yahoo!) or cre-
                                                            
2  http://diasporaproject.org/ 
3  http://ning.com, acquired by Glam Media in 2011. 
ate a fresh one. Examining the enterprise sector we find, for example, Yammer4 and 
Jabber.5  
As this plethora of social networks suggests, many (if not most) of us have multi-
ple online identities through which we actively manage our social interactions. Often 
these identities are anonymous, and many of us would suffer embarrassment, loss or 
worse if all these identities were publicly linked. Many reasons why we choose to 
explicitly manage overlap among our social networks, even keeping some networks 
completely distinct from others, are completely normal and not in the least clandes-
tine. For example, teenagers wishing to discuss sensitive health matters in online fora 
[4], employees complaining about treatment at work [5], or those engaged in political 
commentary in uncomfortable or dangerous situations [6]. 
Attempts by the major services to support this richness in our social networks via 
access control mechanisms, e.g., Facebook lists, Google+ Circles, have proved largely 
inadequate. Typically whilst users understand how these mechanisms work the cogni-
tive effort required for creation and maintenance results in either their mis- or non-
use. Furthermore, collating all of one’s social interactions and data into a single ser-
vice gives rise to serious risks such as identity theft. 
Fully decentralized systems such as Diaspora have seen some success, but are still 
very much under construction and do not address the entire problem. Other decentral-
ized versions of common services include status.net for microblogging (centralized 
equivalent: Twitter), wordpress.org for blogging (centralized equivalent: Word-
press.com), and use of the git repository management system and its built-in web-
server for collaboration around code (centralized equivalent: Github). To take Diaspo-
ra as one of the more mature examples, it supports asymmetric sharing, and federation 
among Diaspora pods, whether community or individual, enabling much greater 
choice over who is trusted. 
In all these cases, whether decentralized or not, the lack of proper boundaries be-
tween such groupings permits inappropriate linking and unexpected leakage of con-
tent and relationships between them and to the outside world [7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. Meth-
ods to detect and resolve privacy conflicts [12], and more generally, to limit and mon-
itor information released online [13] are lacking. 
The issues we note above are not completely new: some in the W3C have previ-
ously noted similar issues concerning uniformity of addressing and access around 
cloud storage,6 for example. However, these and other Linked Data approaches to 
managing our online identities, tend to make presumptions of constituent data being 
public, and fail to properly address questions such as selective sharing of and delega-
tion of access to data, and the need for an ‘app ecosystem’ rather than a focus on hu-
man consumption of data.7 
                                                            
4  http://yammer.com/, acquired by Microsoft in 2012. 
5  http://www.cisco.com/web/products/voice/jabber.html, acquired by Cisco in 2008. 
6  http://www.w3.org/DesignIssues/CloudStorage.html 
7  http://www.ted.com/talks/tim_berners_lee_on_the_next_web.html 
3 Your Grandfather’s Internet 
The essence of our argument is that current online social network platforms are ul-
timately limited, for one of two reasons. First, whether centralized or decentralized 
they are use-specific and to date have been designed with service specific APIs, limit-
ing the scope of the applications that can be built8 and requiring that any specific ap-
plication be implemented afresh for each platform. Second, the terms and conditions 
commonly prohibit the use of multiple accounts: to express multiple identities we 
must use several services. Even for those services that permit – or at least, do not 
prohibit – multiple identities, the possibility of correlating accounts through means as 
simple as IP access address requires trusting (at least!) the provider to not do this, 
limiting privacy. 
Our approach to this problem develops by analogy9 to the development of the 
ARPANET into the CATENET and thus the Internet, and so we next sketch this his-
toric development. 
Proposed in the late 1960 and first implemented in 1969, the ARPANET was one 
of the first operational packet-switched networks. 10  A key part of the early 
ARPANET was the Host-to-Host protocol, known as the Network Control Protocol 
(NCP, 1970) [15], that provided connectivity and flow control between processes 
running on different ARPANET- connected hosts. In 1974 Kahn and Cerf presented a 
protocol for interconnecting distinct packet networks [16], separating the notions of 
host-host data transfer and inter-network communication via a sequence of gateways. 
In 1977, Jon Postel introduced IEN 2 [17] as follows “The position taken here is 
that internetwork communication should be view as having two components: the hop 
by hop relaying of a message, and the end to end control of the conversation.” and 
subsequently wrote “We are screwing up in our design of internet protocols by violat-
ing the principle of layering.”. In IEN 2 he proposes the split of TCP into IP (known 
therein as “the Internet Hop Protocol”) and TCP (known therein as “the Internet Host 
Protocol”), and subsequently as IP and TCP. Following the RFC process, the imple-
mentation of this split is described in RFC801 [18], with the final “flag day” (January 
1st, 1983) when the ARPANET ceased to support NCP, switching over completely to 
IP/TCP. 
Building on previous work by Pouzin [19], Cerf set out the “Catenet11 strategy for 
internetworking” [20] in 1978. This, and other, elements were later elaborated into the 
Internet architecture by Clark [21]. Clearly a great deal of related work took place at 
the time, and things have developed enormously since then. However, the core of the 
Internet architecture is this separation between a network layer provided by IP and a 
transport layer provided by TCP. The former is responsible for addressing and trans-
ferring data between hosts (implicitly identified with network interfaces), and the 
latter for transferring data between processes. 
                                                            
8  Never mind the limitations on use placed on many of the APIs. 
9  With awareness of the perils of this approach [14]. 
10  http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet 
11  From ‘concatenated networks’. 
This architecture had, ultimately, enormous commercial impact. The simplicity of 
the IP layer meant that it could easily be ported to run over almost any underlying link 
layer technology [22]. Over the course of the 1970s, 80s and 90s this led to the dimin-
ishing in importance of proprietary local area network technology from vendors such 
as IBM, DEC and Xerox in favor of support for IP. On the flip side, software devel-
opers could cease caring what particular flavor of network they were operating over, 
and simply assume that IP, and their choice of transport protocol (e.g., TCP, UDP), 
were available. The result was a steady explosion in the use of the network, reaching 
back to email in 1972, but continuing with other applications such as FTP, Gopher, 
the web, BitTorrent, YouTube, and on into the present day and foreseeable future. 
4 Refactoring Social Networks 
It is easy to see the inherent weakness of the dominant centralized social networks 
such as Facebook: by imposing a one-size-fits-all model on social interaction, while 
they (the social networks) may satisfy some of the needs of a large number of people, 
they will never be able to satisfy all the needs of all the people. In particular, their 
centralized cloud-hosted nature means that they very poorly, if at all, support our need 
for multiple online identities where we are in control of the linking of those identities 
[3]. Referring to our sketch of the Internet’s evolution, we see commercial systems 
like Facebook as analogous to proprietary networking solutions: while initially suc-
cessful and certainly satisfactory for many customers, they were too restrictive to 
enable the explosion of use that the Internet subsequently saw. Only by interposing a 
simple interconnection layer such as IP could the complexity of development for the-
se proprietary networks be contained, and their utility accessed. 
Decentralized approaches such as Diaspora address that weakness to some extent, 
but a more subtle – but still serious – problem remains. By baking the data types han-
dled by the system into the data exchange protocols, users must either cast the data 
they wish to exchange into the formats supported, or install expensive, brittle and 
bug-prone gateways to interconnect different networks (cf. “Relay Service” [17]). 
Again, comparing to our sketch of the Internet’ evolution, this is analogous to the 
mistake noted in the early development of the Internet protocols. Only by separating 
concerns between IP and TCP (and other transport protocols subsequently) could the 
combination of absolute flexibility and a simple, uniform protocol interface be pro- 
vided. 
Finally, a key requirement for providing the levels of access control, communica-
tion privacy and (where desired) authenticated identity required by such disparate and 
personal interaction is the ability to securely and coherently generate, manage and 
distribute secrets. Only by providing consistent mechanisms for deriving and distrib-
uting appropriate public key material can we begin to meet the complex, multi-faceted 
identity needs of real life. 
In short, without a simple way to interconnect and manage our identities on differ-
ent social networks, we will not see the same explosion in creativity that the Internet 
gave rise to.  
We close this discussion of the merits of refactoring currently popular social net-
work services with a key observation concerning email. Since the early days of the 
ARPANET (ca. 1972), Internet users have commonly used several email addresses, 
e.g., to distinguish personal and university/corporate communication. Indeed, today’s 
Internet users are often forced to have several email addresses, e.g., one in the cloud 
that provides some longevity, and one forced upon them by their ISP for ISP to con-
sumer communication. 
As a result, we have designed the tools – primarily email clients – to understand 
and manage this. Importantly, the only point at which these our many email identities 
must exist together is within those clients in the private context of our personal devic-
es such as mobile phone, tablet and personal computer.12 
5 An Inter-Social Network 
We next elaborate on the technical implications of such a separation of concerns. 
We believe that the key features for an inter-SNS layer are: transport-independent 
addressing, format standardization for referring to data distributed through a particular 
social network, and flexible – but standardized – support for use of asymmetric en-
cryption for per-service and per-recipient authentication and privacy. These features 
can be achieved through: 
Loose binding of identities. Where a single person has multiple online identities, the 
linking of these identities will only be performed in client software based on out-of-
band information; identities need not explicitly contain any information that can be 
used to link them together. Instead linking must rely on information provided by the 
person to whom the identities refer, or the knowledge of the person who has a social 
network connection to the first person. This will allow messages being produced by 
the same author to be identified whilst also protecting the identities of the author. 
Semi-structured data. By defining and making available schema details for messag-
es, and providing enough information within the message (the semi-structure) to de-
termine the scheme, the online social network service provider is at liberty to struc-
ture their messages as they see fit. In some cases a message might be nothing more 
than a string of specified length, or an image; in others, a message might have very 
rich structure, with extensive metadata in addition to the raw content. 
Asymmetry & Authentication. Schema can be defined that support part or all of a 
message being encrypted, enabling privacy and authentication. Contacts would be 
                                                            
12  Some folk may choose to configure a single cloud-hosted email service to fetch mail from 
all their accounts for simplicity, but this is a personal choice and by doing so they risk mak-
ing confidential information available for data-mining by cloud-providers. 
required to associate trust relationships through out-of-band mechanisms such as 
OAuth or face-to-face interaction. 
5.1 Discussion 
Support for legacy social networks is straightforward to achieve, much as IP was 
provided over legacy proprietary networks. From a technical point-of-view, one could 
provide service shims13 that implement the above abstraction over existing proprietary 
APIs. As noted above however the brittle nature of these APIs would necessitate con-
stant updating of these shims to track the changes in the APIs, the technical challenge 
is therefore only one piece of the puzzle. From a regulatory point-of-view it looks 
increasingly likely that moves such as upcoming EU data protection regulation and 
the UK’s midata14 initiative will enshrine a right for each of us to extract all the data 
by and about us held by a social network, enabling us easily to move away from lega-
cy services. Applications can then be written that make use of the simplicity and 
transparency of the new API (as specified by these regulations), enabling much 
smoother and richer social integration in our online interactions rather than the current 
state where we are limited to either using a social network identity with a third party 
service (and the privacy infringement that entails) or simple (re-)posting of data on 
pre-specified services. 
5.2 Current Implementation 
We are currently working towards the creation of a prototype social networking 
platform that will allow us to experiment with the key features of; loose binding of 
identities, semi-structured data and asymmetry and authentication as described above. 
Whilst there are many aspects to social networking, including identity and relation-
ships (e.g., Twitter followers, Facebook friends), we have chosen messaging as our 
starting point and are developing prototypes in order to experiment and study with 
message structure and message transport; our initial goal being the development of a 
generic client for aggregating content across multiple social networks. Fig. 1. shows a 
high-level diagram of the prototype architecture. 
The shim layer is responsible for fetching messages (Facebook feed, Twitter time-
line) and contacts from existing social networks (we have currently implemented 
shims for Facebook and Twitter) and posting messages to these networks.  It is also 
responsible for conversion of messages and contacts from the network specific for-
mats to the format used by the prototype (semi-structured data).  The storage format 
we are experimenting with for storing messages in the Internet Message Format [23] 
(commonly referred to as email).  Through MIME [24], an email body is able to store 
a wide variety of content, especially content typically associated with social network 
messages (text, images, video, etc.) making it an appropriate selection for message 
                                                            
13  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shim_%28computing%29 
14  https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/providing-better-information-and-protection-for-
consumers/supporting-pages/personal-data 
storage.  Using this format also allows us to re-use existing email clients as clients for 
the prototype (e.g., we can use the Thunderbird15 email client to read and write mes-
sages). 
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Fig. 1. Prototype platform architecture 
Multiple social network accounts can be registered with the shim layer, where each 
account is treated as a separate identity.  The platform is the only place where these 
identities are explicitly associated with each other (loose binding of identities).  A 
user of the platform is able to aggregate content from their different ac-
counts/identities but they are the only person who can view the aggregate, when send-
ing messages they can explicitly control the account/identity (or multiples thereof) 
that is (are) used to transmit the message. 
The processor layer is a queue through which incoming and outgoing messages are 
routed.  Each processor is a small independent application that performs actions on 
                                                            
15  https://www.mozilla.org/en-GB/thunderbird/ 
each message as the message passes through the queue.  One example processor that 
we are developing is to provide encryption for outgoing messages where the recipient 
is known to accept encrypted messages.  Other suggested uses for the processor layer 
are to provide cross-social network search or integrated spam filtering. 
Finally, replication of the storage layer across multiple locations allows redundan-
cy and for clients to access messages from multiple independent locations, e.g., a 
mobile device could maintain a copy of the store so that messages can be accessed in 
periods of no-connectivity.  In addition, replication will allow processors to run in the 
most appropriate environment, e.g., a processor intensive processor could run in the 
cloud on a high-performance device rather than a mobile device where computational 
power is at a premium. 
5.3 Evaluation 
At this present time, the prototype has not yet reached a point of development at 
which we can begin to experiment with it and evaluate it fully. We are able however 
to provide the following evaluation based on its current status. In particular we can 
begin to evaluate the implications of transferring the responsibility of message storage 
from social network providers to the individual. Taking the specific example of Twit-
ter as a social network service provider, message storage is handled by Twitter and is 
thus of zero-cost to an individual user. Within our proposed system, storage for mes-
sages must be provided by the user the space requirements for which will only grow 
over time and thus incur a cost (options such as free online storage providers are an 
option there is however still an administrative cost involved in setting up and main-
taining these). An analysis of the authors’ Twitter streams when mapped to a MIME 
email message reveals an average size per message of 2 kilobytes (increasing signifi-
cantly if the Tweet has an image attached). Whilst usage between users will vary 
greatly in terms of numbers of messages received we can begin to use this figure as a 
baseline to calculate storage costs. For example, a user receiving an average of 100 
Tweets per day will require storage for approximately 71 megabytes within a year. 
Alone, a fairly trivial amount of storage but once we start factoring in other social 
networks, particularly media rich networks such as Flickr, this figure could increase 
significantly. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper we have elaborated on three serious problems that we perceive with 
the current state of online social networking, from a systems/networking point-of-
view. As a result, we believe it is necessary to revisit the ways that we have been 
architecting and building online social networking platforms, to provide a cleaner 
separation of layers. This will enable greater flexibility, creativity and utility in the 
exploitation of our social graphs, while also providing us with greater control over 
that exploitation. We believe that doing so will open social networking up to richer 
application development, and so will enable the same kind of explosion in use that the 
Internet caused with computer networking. 
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